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28 April 1960

Copy No. C 68

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



DOCUMENT NO. 51
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. ☒
☐ DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S O
NEXT REVIEW DATE: 2010
AUTH: HR 70-2
9 JUN 1980
DATE: _____ REVIEWER:

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State Department review completed

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Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005000510001-9

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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DAILY BRIEF

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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

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USSR: The Soviet trawler Vega, fitted with an unusual amount of electronic equipment and towing an unidentified object astern, attempted to recover a Polaris test vehicle launched by the US submarine George Washington during tests on 26 April about 120 miles off the coast of New Jersey. The trawler was forced from the immediate vicinity by the maneuvers of a US Navy tug, but remained in the general area throughout the day. Soviet trawlers have been suspected for some time of engaging in electronic collection efforts against US missile programs. The activities of the Vega are the most aggressive noted to date, and the first to be related to the Polaris program.

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II. ASIA-AFRICA

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Libya: On 25 April, for the first time in Libya's eight and a half years as an independent state, the Chamber of Deputies passed a motion of censure against the government. While the specific issue was the government's unpopular decision permitting the visit of Italian fleet units in February 1960, the chamber's action clearly showed the increased strength of opposition elements following January's parliamentary elections. These elements can be expected to exert further strong pressure for modification of the American military base agreement, and King Idriss may soon appoint a new prime minister and other cabinet officials who will be more susceptible to such pressure. [REDACTED]

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Belgian Congo - USSR: Stepped-up efforts by both bloc officials and Belgian Communists to gain a foothold in the Belgian Congo, which becomes independent on 30 June, pose a threat to the Congo's pro-Western inclination. The consul general in Leopoldville observes that Communist contacts with the Congolese have increased since the round-table conference in Brussels last February, when numerous Congolese delegates took advantage of invitations to visit the bloc. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] the Soviet Union is willing to give the Congolese "all the aid that they desire" after independence. [REDACTED]

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
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OK South Korea: Minister of Foreign Affairs Ho Chong, acting as president, is reported to have selected most of the members of his new cabinet, although their appointments have not been announced. Although Ho is facing difficulties securing men of top caliber for service in a caretaker cabinet in a fluid political situation, Ambassador McConaughy considers the proposed appointees to be generally reputable figures who would be able to begin the cleanup the public expects. Ho is worried over whether the cleanup move will be fast enough to satisfy the high tide of popular expectations. South Korean constitutional authorities have pointed out that an announcement of a new election for president and vice president must be made by 17 June to meet legal requirements. The issue of these elections, however, is being complicated by the controversy in the National Assembly over demands that election of a new assembly should have priority over any other political action.

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


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IV. WATCH COMMITTEE CONCLUSIONS

- ND A. [No Sino-Soviet bloc country intends to initiate hostilities against the continental US or its possessions in the immediate future.]


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- B. [No Sino-Soviet bloc country intends deliberately to initiate direct military action against US forces abroad, US allies, or areas peripheral to the orbit in the immediate future.]

Note: [Although the Chinese Nationalists have shown concern over the possibility of an attack on the offshore islands, the Chinese Communists do not appear to intend major offensive military action in the immediate future. They have, however, maintained their capabilities to bring heavy pressure on the Taiwan Strait area and could initiate an attack on the offshore islands with little or no warning.]

- C. [The following developments are susceptible of direct exploitation by Soviet/Communist hostile action which could jeopardize the security of the US in the immediate future:]

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[None.]

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Communist Influence in Belgian Congo Apparently Increasing

Stepped-up efforts by both bloc officials and Belgian Communists to gain a foothold in the Belgian Congo, which becomes independent on 30 June, pose a threat to the Congo's pro-Western inclination.

Belgium's policy of isolating its colony from outside political influences--successful until 1959--appears to have prevented the establishment of a Communist party in the Congo. At the same time, this enforced isolation produced a group of first-generation Congolese leaders with little experience in other than local affairs and little understanding of Communist techniques.

Following the round-table conference in Brussels last February, which set the date for Congolese independence, numerous Congolese delegates accepted invitations to visit the Soviet Union or one or more of the European satellites. A number of Congolese politicians solicited Communist financial support for the legislative election campaign now in progress. One of the Congo's leading political figures, Patrice Lumumba, is believed to have Communist financial backing. Possibly in the hope of Communist support after independence, a number of Congolese groups have indicated to the Belgian Communist party that they are in accord with and will follow some of the party's policies.

Lumumba stated on 19 April that the Congo, when it becomes independent, will follow a policy of nonalignment and "positive neutrality." In an apparent bid for recognition as the leading Congolese spokesman, he added that "we welcome all who wish to help our country develop." [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] the Soviet Union is willing to give the Congolese "all the aid they desire" after independence. Belgian officials have indicated that they expect the USSR to have an ambassador in Leopoldville "on 1 July." [REDACTED]

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New South Korean Cabinet

Minister of Foreign Affairs Ho Chong became Acting President of South Korea on 27 April with a cabinet of only two other members--Yi Ho as home minister and Kwon Sung-yol as justice minister. Ho, who immediately ordered holdover cabinet ministers of the Rhee administration to transfer their powers temporarily to the incumbent vice ministers, is reported now to have selected most of the men he will appoint to his new cabinet. As a result of the fluid political situation, Ho is facing difficulties securing men of top caliber for service in a caretaker cabinet. Ambassador McConaughy considers the proposed appointees--whose names have not been announced publicly--to be generally reputable figures who should be able to begin the cleanup the public expects.

The expected appointees include a respected banker with a reputation for honesty as finance minister, a qualified agricultural expert as minister of agriculture, and a prominent Seoul surgeon as minister of health and social affairs. Kim Chung-yol, minister of defense in the last Rhee cabinet, is expected to remain in this post in the new administration. Kim has been a capable and relatively honest administrator, and he may have received some credit for the way the enforcement of martial law has maintained the good will of the public.

Ho is worried over whether he can move fast enough in cleaning up and making reforms to satisfy the high tide of public expectations. Seoul is reported to be returning to normal with students helping in removing debris, performing traffic duties, and cooperating with the martial-law commander. Kyonghyang Sinmun, the paper closed by Rhee, issued its first edition on 27 April featuring a front-page picture showing a statue of Rhee being dragged down the street while people spat on it.

South Korean constitutional authorities have pointed out that the announcement of a new election for president and vice president

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must be made by 17 June to meet legal requirements. Such an election would be for full four-year terms. The issue of a new election, however, is complicated by a controversy in the National Assembly over demands by some opposition Democrats that voting for a new assembly should be held before any other political action is taken. The Democrats are also divided over whether the assembly should be dissolved before or after the amendment of the constitution to provide for a parliamentary system of government. One Democratic assemblyman argues that it is not valid for Liberal party members who were elected through fraud to participate in changing the constitution. [REDACTED]

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Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
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